We introduce a simple Role-based Trust-management language RT 0 and a set-theoretic semantics for it. We also introduce credential graphs as a searchable representation of credentials in RT 0 and prove that reachability in credential graphs is sound and complete with respect to the semantics of RT 0 . Based on credential graphs, we give goal-directed algorithms to do credential chain discovery in RT 0 , both when credential storage is centralized and when credential storage is distributed. A goal-directed algorithm begins with an access-control query and searches for credentials relevant to the query, while avoiding considering the potentially very large number of credentials that are unrelated to the access-control decision at hand. This approach provides better expected-case performance than bottom-up algorithms. We show how our algorithms can be applied to SDSI 2.0 (the "SDSI" part of SPKI/SDSI 2.0).
Introduction
customers. StateU delegates the authority over identifying students to RegistrarB, the registrar of one of StateU's campuses. RegistrarB then issues a credential to Alice stating that Alice is a student. These are represented by four RT 0 credentials: EPub.discount ←− EOrg.preferred (1) EOrg.preferred ←− StateU.student (2) StateU.student ←− RegistrarB.student (3) RegistrarB.student ←− Alice (
The credential "EPub.discount ←− EOrg.preferred" can be read as: if EOrg gives some entity the attribute "preferred", EPub gives the entity the attribute "discount". An alternative reading is that the set of entities that are entitled to EPub.discount includes the set of entities entitled to EOrg.preferred. In this credential, we call EPub the issuer, EOrg the subject, and "EOrg.preferred" the body of the credential. Similarly, for "RegistrarB.student ←− Alice", we call RegistrarB the issuer and Alice the subject, as well as the body, of the credential. The four credentials above form a chain proving that Alice is entitled to a discount:
EPub.discount (1) ←− EOrg.preferred (2) ←− StateU.student (3) ←− RegistrarB.student (4) ←− Alice.
When one tries to prove that Alice is entitled to EPub's discount, each credential in the chain needs to be collected. The question we take up is where credentials should be stored to enable that collection. We say an entity A stores a credential if we can find the credential once we know A. Some other entity, such as a directory, may actually house the credential on A's behalf. Also, by storing a credential, we mean both storing and providing access to the credential. To be useful, a credential must be stored with its issuer or with its subject.
In Example 1, suppose that credential (1) is a local policy stored with EPub, and (4) is stored with Alice. One needs to be able to find (2) and (3). The most realistic arrangement is to have credential (2) stored with EOrg and (3) with RegistrarB. 1 The chain can then be discovered by searching for the credentials that compose the chain, starting from its two ends. Starting from Alice, one can find (4), thereby learning that one needs to go to RegistrarB to look for credentials involving RegistrarB.student. In this way, one can obtain (3) . From the other direction, knowing (1) , one can go to EOrg and find (2) , thereby completing discovery of the chain shown above. No prior TM system supports discovery in this arrangement, probably because subject-and issuerstorage cannot be intermixed arbitrarily: if both (2) and (3) are stored exclusively with StateU, the chain cannot be found without trying to contact every entity in the system until, eventually contacting StateU, the credentials are obtained. In most decentralized systems, it is impossible or prohibitively expensive to enumerate all entities in the systems. For all practical purposes, if one cannot find a credential chain without contacting every entity, one cannot find it at all.
One approach to avoid storing both (2) and (3) only with StateU is to require that all credentials be stored with subjects. This enables one to find the credentials (4), (3) , and (2) successively, thereby discovering the chain. A disadvantage of this arrangement is that it requires StateU to store all the credentials authorizing StateU's students for any resource. This makes StateU a bottleneck. Also, one can argue that (2) is really a local policy of EOrg; there should be no need for EOrg to give the credential to StateU. This point is further illustrated in Example 2 below.
Another approach is to require all credentials be stored with their issuers; then the chain can also be discovered. However, this approach is impractical for many applications. For instance, it would require credential (4) to be stored with RegistrarB. Requiring RegistrarB to be the sole provider of access to student registration credentials imposes a significant burden. We will discuss the problems with issuer storage of credentials further in Example 2 below.
A more reasonable scheme is to require each credential that has an entity as its body, e.g., credential (4) , to be stored with its subject, and all other credentials stored with issuers. This scheme would enable the chain in Example 1 to be found; however, this simple scheme does not work when credentials use more expressive features in trust-management systems. Some TM systems, such as SDSI and Delegation Logic, allow what we call attribute-based delegation, that is the delegation of attribute authority to entities having certain attributes. Attribute-based delegation is achieved in SDSI through linked names, and in Delegation Logic through dynamic threshold structures and through conditional delegations. Attribute-based delegation is illustrated in the following example.
Example 2 In Example 1, we have "EOrg.preferred ←− StateU.student". This is a delegation from EOrg to StateU. Now say EOrg considers students of all universities to be preferred customers. Without attribute-based delegation, EPub has to know all the universities and delegate explicitly to each of them. Using attribute-based delegation, EOrg can delegate the authority over the identification of students to entities that EOrg believes are legitimate universities. Of course, EOrg can additionally delegate the authority over identifying universities to another entity, e.g., a fictitious Accrediting Board for Universities, ABU. The following scenario revises the one in Example 1. Credentials (1), (3) , and (4) are unchanged, while (2) is replaced by (5) , (6) , and (7).
EPub.discount ←− EOrg.preferred (1) StateU.student ←− RegistrarB.student (3) RegistrarB.student ←− Alice (4) EOrg.university ←− ABU.accredited (5) ABU.accredited ←− StateU (6) EOrg.preferred ←− EOrg.university.student (7) These credentials form a chain from Alice to EPub.discount, consisting of three parts. part(a): EPub.discount (1) ←− EOrg.preferred (7) ←− EOrg.university.student part(b): EOrg.university (5) ←− ABU.accredited (6) ←− StateU part(c): StateU.student (3) ←− RegistrarB.student (4) ←− Alice Here, part (b) shows that StateU has the attribute on the basis of which EOrg delegates to StateU the authority to identify students. In this way, it connects part(a) and part(c) into a chain.
Systems that support attribute-based delegation allow the ability to delegate to strangers whose trustworthiness is determined based on their own attributes. Attribute-based delegation promises flexibility and scalability; however, it significantly complicates the structure and discovery of credential chains. Example 2 illustrates several points. First, requiring all credentials to be stored with subjects is not reasonable. For instance, credential (5) is a local policy of EOrg, and of limited interested to ABU. In Example 1, one could argue that requiring StateU to store credential (2) is still plausible, since (2) authorizes students of StateU. Here, requiring ABU to store all credentials entrusting its judgement on universities is much less plausible. Second, the scheme in which all credentials are stored with their issuers, is impractical. Under such a scheme, in order to prove that Alice belongs to EOrg.university.student, one must obtain from ABU a complete list of universities, and then contact each university in turn to ask whether Alice is their student. Third, if all chains were linear, it might be reasonable simply to store with subjects exactly those credentials having entities as their bodies. However, Example 2 illustrates why this approach breaks down when we generalize to allow attribute-based delegation. Using this scheme, starting from EPub, one can find (1), (7) , and (5) . Starting from Alice, one can find (4) . However, since both (3) and (6) are stored only with StateU, we cannot find them.
As we argued, distributed credential chain discovery requires goal-directed evaluation procedures. Even when all credentials are stored centrally, goal-directedness is still a big advantage, especially when the credential pool is very large. For example, in Example 2, suppose that we also have thousands of universities issuing credentials for millions of students. In order to find the chain from Alice to EPub.discount, a bottom-up algorithm, such as the one in [6] , would have to consider each of the millions of credentials. By contrast, a goal-directed algorithm has the potential to avoid touching most of them.
Summary
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we present the syntax and a set-theoretic semantics for RT 0 , which supports attribute-based delegation and subsumes SDSI 2.0 (the "SDSI" part of SPKI/SDSI 2.0 [8] ). In Section 3, we study chain discovery with centrally stored RT 0 credentials. We introduce the notion of credential graphs and present goal-directed, graph-based algorithms for centralized chain discovery in RT 0 . We also show how to use our algorithms to perform goal-directed chain discovery for SDSI 2.0, for which existing algorithms are either not goal-directed, or do not support alternation between credential collection and evaluation steps. In Section 4, we extend the algorithms in Section 3 and present an algorithm to do chain discovery in RT 0 when credential storage is distributed. We also introduce notions of traversable chains and prove that traversable chains can be discovered by using the distributed search algorithm. In Section 5, we introduce a type system for credential storage and a notion of well-typed credentials; they constrain credential storage sufficiently to ensure chain traversability with well-typed credentials. This type system can also help improve search efficiency by guiding search in the right direction, making distributed chain discovery with large number of credentials feasible. In Section 6, we discuss future directions and related work. We conclude in Section 7. An appendix provides all proofs not contained in the paper's body.
RT 0 : A Role-based Trust-management Language
The credentials presented in Examples 1 and 2 are RT 0 credentials. We now formally introduce RT 0 . In Section 2.1, we present RT 0 's syntax, discuss its intended meaning, and compare it to SDSI. In Section 2.2, we give a declarative semantics for RT 0 .
The Syntax of RT 0
The basic constructs of RT 0 include entities and role names. Entities are also called principals in the literature. They can issue credentials and make requests. RT assumes that one can determine which entity issued a particular credential or request. Public/private key pairs clearly make this possible. In some environments, an entity could also be, say, a secret key or a user account. In this paper, we use A, B, and D, sometimes with subscripts, to denote entities. In RT 0 , a role name is an identifier, say, a string. We use r, r 1 , r 2 , etc., to denote role names.
RT 0 also has roles. A role takes the form of an entity followed by a role name, separated by a dot, e.g., A.r and B.r 1 . The notion of roles is central in RT 0 . A role in RT defines a set of entities who are members of this role. Each entity A has the authority to define who are the members of each role of the form A.r. A role can also be viewed as an attribute. An entity is a member of a role if and only if it has the attribute identified by the role. For example, we can view StateU.student both as a role (or a group of entities) and as an attribute. In RT 0 , an access control permission is represented as a role as well. For example, the permission to shut down a computer can be represented by a role OS.shutdown.
There are four kinds of credentials in RT 0 , each corresponding to a different way of defining role membership:
A and B are (possibly the same) entities, and r is a role name.
This means that A defines B to be a member of A's r role, i.e., members(A.r) B, where members(A.r) represents the set of entities that are members of A.r. In the attribute-based view, this credential can be read as B has the attribute A.r, or equivalently, A says that B has the attribute r.
• Type-2 : A.r ←− B.r 1
A and B are (possibly the same) entities, and r and r 1 are (possibly the same) role names.
This means that A defines its r role to include all members of B's r 1 role, i.e., members(A.r) ⊇ members(B.r 1 ). In other words, A defines the role B.r 1 to be more powerful than A.r, in the sense that a member of B.r 1 can do anything that the role A.r is authorized to do. Such credentials can be used to define role hierarchies in Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) [19] . The attribute-based reading of this credential is: if B says that an entity has the attribute r 1 , then A says that it has the attribute r. In particular, if r and r 1 are the same, this is a delegation from A to B of authority over r.
• Type-3 :
A is an entity, and r, r 1 , and r 2 are role names. We call A.r 1 .r 2 a linked role.
This means that members(A.r) ⊇ members(A.r 1 .r 2 ) = B∈members(A.r 1 ) members(B.r 2 ). The attribute-based reading of this credential is: if A says that an entity B has the attribute r 1 , and B says that an entity D has the attribute r 2 , then A says that D has the attribute r. If r and r 2 are the same, A is delegating its authority over r to anyone that A believes to have the attribute r 1 . This is attribute-based delegation: A identifies B as an authority on r 2 not by using (or knowing) B's identity, but by another attribute B has (viz., r 1 ).
• Type-4 :
A is an entity, k is an integer greater than 1, and for each j ∈ [1..k], f j is an entity, a role, or a linked role starting with A. We call
This means that members(A.r) ⊇ (members(f 1 ) ∩ · · · ∩ members(f k )).
A role expression is an entity, a role, a linked role, or an intersection. We use e, e 1 , e 2 , etc, to denote role expressions. By contrast, we use f 1 , . . . , f k to denote the intersection-free expressions occurring in intersections. All credentials in RT 0 take the form, A.r ←− e, where e is a role expression. Such a credential means that members(A.r) ⊇ members(e), as we formalize in Section 2.2 below. We say that this credential defines the role A.r. (This choice of terminology is motivated by analogy to name definitions in SDSI, as well as to predicate definitions in logic programming.) We call A the issuer, e the body, and each entity in base(e) a subject of this credential, where base(e) is defined as follows: base(A) = {A}, base(A.r) = {A}, base(A.r 1 .r 2 ) = {A},
Readers familiar with Simple Distributed Security Infrastructure (SDSI) [6, 8] may notice the similarity between RT 0 and SDSI's name certificates. Indeed, our design is heavily influenced by existing trust-management systems, especially SDSI and Delegation Logic (DL) [16] . RT 0 can be viewed as an extension to SDSI 2.0 or a syntactically sugared version of a subset of DL. The arrows in RT 0 credentials are the reverse direction of those in SPKI/SDSI. We choose to use this direction to be consistent with an underlying logic programming reading of credentials and with directed edges in credential graphs, introduced below in Section 3. In addition, RT 0 differs from SDSI 2.0 in the following two aspects.
First, SDSI allows arbitrarily long linked names, while we allow only length-2 linked roles. There are a couple of reasons for this design. We are not losing any expressive power; one can always break up a long chain by introducing additional role names and credentials. Moreover, it often makes sense to break long chains up, as doing so creates more modular policies. If A wants to use B.r 1 .r 2 . · · · .r k in its credential, then B.r 1 .r 2 . · · · .r k−1 must mean something to A; otherwise, why would A delegate authority to members of B.r 1 .r 2 . · · · .r k−1 ? Having to create a new role makes A think about what B.r 1 .r 2 . · · · .r k−1 means. Finally, restricting the length of linked roles simplifies the design of algorithms for chain discovery and the storage type scheme for guaranteeing distributed discovery. For the same reasons, we do not allow credentials of the form A.r ←− B.r 1 .r 2 when A = B.
Second, SDSI does not have RT 0 's type-4 credentials, and so RT 0 is more expressive than the current version of SDSI 2.0. Intersections and threshold structures (e.g., those in [8] ) can be used to implement one another. Threshold structures may appear in name certificates according to [8] and earlier versions of [9] . This is disallowed in [6] and the most up-to-date version of [9] , because threshold structures are viewed as too complex [6] . Intersections provide similar functionality with simple and clear semantics.
Note that a type-2 credential A.r ←− B.r 1 can be represented using a type-1 credential and a type-3 credential: A.r 0 ←− B, A.r ←− A.r 0 .r 1 , in which r 0 is a new role name. We chose to include type-2 credentials nonetheless because of the following two practical considerations. First, conceptually, a type-2 credential represents a simple delegation, while a type-3 credential represents an attribute-based delegation, which is a more complicated notion. Second, we expect type-2 credentials are much more common than type-3 credentials and want to avoid having to use extra role names and credentials to represent them. Also note that although we restrict length of linked roles, we chose not to restrict the size of an intersection. We could require each intersection to be of the form A.r ←− f 1 ∩ f 2 ; one can break up long intersections by introducing new role names and credentials. However, for RT 0 , we find no semantic motivation or practical benefit for requiring this, unlike in the case of long linked names.
The Semantics of RT 0
This section presents a declarative semantics of RT 0 . We begin by formalizing the syntactic categories of the language. RT 0 has a countable set of entities, denoted by Entity, and a countable set of role names, denoted by RoleName. The sets Role, LinkedRole, Intersection, and RoleExpression are respectively the sets of roles, linked roles, intersections, and role expressions over Entity and RoleName:
Definition 1 (Set-theoretic Semantics, S C ) For a given set 3 C of RT 0 credentials, the semantics of C, S C , is a function mapping roles to sets of entities: S C : Role → ℘(Entity), where ℘(Entity) is the power set of Entity. We define S C to be the least function 4 rmem : Role → ℘(Entity) that satisfies the following system of set inequalities:
where expr[rmem] : RoleExpression → ℘(Entity) is defined as follows:
Note that expr naturally extends S C to role expressions: expr[S C ](e) gives the set of members of any role expression e.
We use this least-solution definition for S C because credentials may define roles recursively. In the following paragraphs, we show that S C is well defined and present a straightforward way to construct the least solution finitely.
Given a set C of credentials, we define the following finite structures: Entities(C) is the set of entities in C, Names(C) is the set of role names in C, Roles(C) is the set of roles that can be constructed using entities in Entities(C) and role names in Names(C).
We now define the function rmem ∞ , which maps each role in Roles(C) to a set of entities in Entities(C), to be the limit of a sequence {rmem i } i∈N , where N is the set of natural numbers, and where for each i, rmem i : Roles(C) → ℘(Entities(C)). This sequence of functions is defined inductively by taking rmem 0 (A.r) = ∅ for each role A.r in Roles(C), and by defining
The set of all functions f : Roles(C) → ℘(Entities(C)) forms a finite lattice, and iterate is a monotonic function over this lattice, because the operators used to construct it (∩ and ∪) are monotonic. Therefore, the least fixpoint of iterate is known to exist. Consider the function g : RoleExpression → ℘(Entity) that maps any role A.r in Roles(C) to rmem ∞ (A.r) and any role not in Roles(C) to the empty set. The function g is the semantic function S C : it clearly satisfies the system of set inequalities in Definition 1, and one can show by induction that any function that satisfies these inequalities is greater than or equal to g.
Example 3
We revise the scenario in Example 2 slightly, reusing and renumbering several of those credentials. Now EPub offers a special discount to anyone who is both a preferred customer of EOrg and an ACM member, and Alice is both.
EPub.spdiscount ←− EOrg.preferred ∩ ACM.member (1) EOrg.preferred ←− EOrg.university.student (2) EOrg.university ←− ABU.accredited (3) ABU.accredited ←− StateU (4) StateU.student ←− RegistrarB.student (5) RegistrarB.student ←− Alice (6) ACM.member ←− Alice
We now give the computation of the semantics of this set of credentials. Showing only the new elements added to the function's value in each step, the successive values of rmem i are as follows: for i = 1, ABU.accredited → {StateU}, RegistrarB.student → {Alice}, ACM.member → {Alice} for i = 2, EOrg.university → {StateU}, StateU.student → {Alice} for i = 3, EOrg.preferred → {Alice} for i = 4, EPub.spdiscount → {Alice} The sequence stabilizes at i = 4.
Centralized Credential Chain Discovery
In this section, we study credential chain discovery for RT 0 , under the assumption that all the relevant credentials are stored centrally. Given a set C of RT 0 credentials, three common kinds of queries (goals) are:
1. Given a role expression e and an entity D, determine whether D ∈ expr[S C ](e).
2. Given a role expression e, determine its member set, expr[S C ](e).
3. Given an entity D, determine all the roles it is a member of, i.e., all role A.r's such that D ∈ S C (A.r).
When an entity D submits a request to access a particular resource, and it is the access mediator's policy to authorize members of the role A.r to access the resource, then the access mediator needs to determine whether D ∈ S C (A.r). We call this a query (or a goal). Recall that expr[S C ](A.r) = S C (A.r), and so D ∈ S C (A.r) is a query of the first kind. The other two kinds are useful for evaluating the effects of credentials. They are used for determining all entities that are granted a certain permission and all permissions granted to a particular entity. They are also used in the course of answering the first kind of query, in order to handle linked roles. In this section, we give goal-directed algorithms for answering these three kinds of queries.
Algorithm Requirements and Related Work
Chain discovery in RT 0 shares two key characteristics with discovery in SDSI: linked names give credential chains a non-linear structure and role definitions can be recursive. Cyclic dependencies must be handled carefully, to avoid non-termination. Clarke et al. [6] have given an algorithm for chain discovery in SPKI/SDSI 2.0. Their algorithm views each credential as a rewriting rule and views discovery as a term-rewriting problem. The algorithm handles cyclic dependency by using a bottom-up approach, performing a closure operation over the set of all credentials before it finds one chain. This may be suitable when large numbers of queries are made about a slowly changing credential pool of modest size. However, when the credential pool is large, or when the frequency of changes to the credential pool (particularly deletions, such as credential expirations or revocations) approaches the frequency of queries against the pool, the efficiency of the bottom-up approach deteriorates rapidly.
Li [15] gave a 4-rule logic program to calculate meanings of SDSI credentials. Cyclic dependencies are handled by using XSB [11] to evaluate the program. XSB, unlike most other Prolog engines, uses an extension table mechanism and guarantees termination of a large class of programs, including, but not limited to, all Datalog programs. Yet, for many trust-management applications, this solution is excessively heavy-weight. Even the stripped down version of XSB is several megabytes, while the jar file of the current RT 0 engine is less than 40KB. Moreover, based on our past experience using XSB [14, 15] , it is often hard to integrate with XSB closely; and one has less control than needed during the inference process. For example, it would be hard to interleave credential collection with inferencing steps, as needed for distributed chain discovery.
Because we seek techniques that work well when the credential pool is distributed or changes frequently, we require chain discovery algorithms that are goal-directed and that can drive the collection process. They also must support interleaving credential collection and chain construction (i.e., evaluation) steps.
We meet these requirements by providing graph-based algorithms. Credentials are represented by edges. Entities, roles, and other role expressions are represented by nodes. Chain discovery is performed by starting at the node representing the requester, or the node representing the role (permission) to be proven, or both, and then traversing paths in the graph trying to build an appropriate chain. In addition to being goal-directed, this approach allows the elaboration of the graph to be scheduled flexibly. Also, the graphical representation of the evaluation state makes it relatively straightforward to manage cyclic dependencies. Graph-based approaches to chain discovery have been used before, e.g., by Aura [1] for SPKI delegation certificates and by Clarke et al. [6] for SDSI name certificates without linked names. However, neither of them deals with linked names. To our knowledge, our algorithms are the first to use a graphical representation to handle linked roles.
Credential Graphs
A credential graph is a directed graph that represents a set C of credentials and the meanings of these credentials. Each node in a credential graph represents a role expression. Every credential A.r ←− e in C (no matter what type of credential it is) contributes an edge 5 A.r ← e, called a credential edge. Additional edges are added to handle linked roles and intersections. We call these derived edges because their inclusion comes from the existence of other, semantically related, paths in the graph. Each derived edge has one or more support sets; each support set is a set of one or more paths that together justify the existence of the derived edge.
Given a set C of credentials, recall that Entities(C) is the set of entities in C, Names(C) is the set of role names in C. We define the following: Intersections(C) is the set of intersections in C, and FExps(C) is the set of intersection-free role expressions that can be constructed using Entities(C) and Names(C), i.e., FExps(C) = {A, A.r 1 , A.r 1 .r 2 | A ∈ Entities(C), r 1 , r 2 ∈ Names(C)}.
Definition 2 (Credential Graphs) Each credential graph for C is parameterized by a finite set of role expressions Q ⊆ RoleExpression. (Recall that RoleExpression is the set of all role expressions in RT 0 .) The credential graph G C:Q has node set N C:Q and edge set E C:Q , defined as follows:
Q is the least set of edges over N C:Q that satisfies the following three closure properties:
Closure Property 1: If A.r ←− e ∈ C, then A.r ← e ∈ E C:Q . We call A.r ← e a credential edge.
Closure Property 2:
If there is a path A.r 1 * ← B in G C:Q , then A.r 1 .r 2 ← B.r 2 ∈ E C:Q . We call A.r 1 .r 2 ← B.r 2 a derived link edge, and call the path A.r 1 * ← B a support set for the edge.
Closure Property 3:
We call this a derived intersection edge, and say that the union of the paths
The definition of E C:Q can be made effective by inductively constructing a sequence of edge sets {E i C:Q } i∈N whose limit is E C:Q . We take E 0 C:Q = {A.r ← e | A.r ←− e ∈ C} and construct E i+1 C:Q from E i C:Q by adding one edge according to either closure property 2 or 3. Since N C:Q is finite, we do not have to worry about scheduling these additions. At some finite stage, no more edges will be added, and the sequence converges to E C:Q .
Intuitively, Q is a set of role expressions that do not appear in FExps(C) or Intersections(C), but that nonetheless hold interest, e.g., intersections that can be constructed using role expressions in FExps(C), but do not appear in C. When Q = ∅, we call G C:∅ the basic credential graph of C, and use G C to denote this graph, N C to denote its node set, and E C to denote its edge set. G C:Q is always a supergraph of G C , and when Q ⊆ FExps(C) ∪ Intersections(C), G C:Q =G C .
Given a set C of credentials, we define the size of C to be size(C) = A.r←−e ∈ C |e|, where |A| = |A.r| = |A.r 1 .r 2 | = 1 and
Let N be the number of credentials in C and M be size(C). The basic credential graph, G C , of C, has N credential edges. We now show that G C has O(N 2 M ) derived link edges and O(N 2 ) derived intersection edges. To add A.r 1 .r 2 ← B.r 2 , the role node A.r 1 must have an incoming edge and the entity node B must have an outgoing edge. If a role node has an incoming edge, then the edge must be a credential edge; there are O(N ) such roles. If an entity node has outgoing edges, then at least one such edge is a credential edge; there are O(N ) such entities. Figure 1 gives part of the basic credential graph of the credentials in Example 3.
Theorem 1 (Soundness of Credential Graphs) Given a set C of credentials and two role expressions e 1 and e 2 , if there is a path e 2 * ← e 1 in any
. In particular, if there is a path e 6 (7)
StateU.student (5) RegistrarB.student Proof. The proof is by induction on the steps of the construction of {E i C:Q } i∈N in Definition 2. We show the base case by using a second, inner induction on the length of the path e 2 * ← e 1 in E 0 C:Q . The inner base case, in which e 1 = e 2 , is trivial; we consider the step. We decompose e 2 * ← e 1 into e 2 ← e * ← e 1 . Because each edge in E 0 C:Q corresponds to a credential, we have e 2 ←− e ∈ C. It follows that expr[S C ](e 2 ) ⊇ expr[S C ](e ), by definition of S C . The induction hypothesis gives us
We prove the step by again using an inner induction on the length of e 2 * ← e 1 , which we now assume is in E i+1 C:Q . Again the basis is trivial. For the step, we decompose e 2 * ← e 1 into e 2 ← e * ← e 1 . There are three cases for the edge e 2 ← e . case 1: When e 2 ← e is a credential edge, the argument proceeds along the same lines as the base case, using the inner induction hypothesis to derive expr[S C ](e ) ⊇ expr[S C ](e 1 ). case 2: When e 2 ← e is a derived link edge, e 2 has the form A.r 1 .r 2 , e has the form B.r 2 , and there is a path A. Together with the definition of expr for A.r 1 .r 2 , these imply expr[S C ](e 2 ) ⊇ expr[S C ](e 1 ), as required. case 3: When e 2 ← e is a derived intersection edge, e 2 has the form f 1 ∩ · · · ∩ f k , e = e 1 is an entity D (because entity nodes have no incoming edges), and there are paths
Theorem 2 (Completeness of Credential Graphs) Given a set C of credentials, an entity D, and a role expression e 0 such that
See Appendix A.1 for the proof.
Overview of Credential-graph-based Search Algorithms
Together, Theorems 1 and 2 tell us that, given a set C of credentials, we can answer each of the queries enumerated at the top of this section by consulting a credential graph of C. Constructing the path e * ← D alone proves D ∈ expr[S C ](e). However, where e * ← D contains derived edges, each derived edge must have at least one support set for it constructed first. The portion of the credential graph that must be constructed is what we call a credential chain.
Definition 3 (Credential Chains)
Given a set C of credentials and two role expressions e 1 and e 2 , a credential chain from e 1 to e 2 , denoted e 2 e 1 , is a minimal subset of E C:{e 2 } containing a path e 2 * ← e 1 and also containing a support set for each derived edge in the subset. We use C e 2 e 1 to denote the set of credentials in e 2 e 1 , i.e., the set of credentials corresponding to credential edges in e 2 e 1 . 
e 1 is always a subset of E C e 2 e 1 :{e 2 } . The rest of this section gives algorithms that can answer the three kinds of queries, listed at the top of this section, without constructing a complete credential graph. The backward search algorithm, to be presented in Section 3.4, answers the second form of queries, i.e., it determines all members of a role expression. The forward search algorithm in Section 3.5 answers the third form of queries, i.e., it determines all roles that an entity is a member of. The bidirectional search algorithm in Section 3.6 answers the first kind of queries, i.e., it determines whether an entity is a member of a role expression. We then discuss some enhancements of these algorithms in Section 3.7 and show how to apply these algorithms to SDSI 2.0 credentials in Section 3.8.
In Section 4, we will give a distributed search algorithm that subsumes the three algorithms presented in this section. There, we give pseudo-code of the algorithm and prove the correctness of the algorithm. Readers interested in the details of the three algorithms presented in this section may consult Section 4.
The Backward Search Algorithm
We present a backward search algorithm that can determine all the members of a given role expression e 0 . In terms of the credential graph, it finds all the entity nodes that can reach the node e 0 , and for each such entity D, it constructs every chain e 0 D . We call it backward because it follows edges in the reverse direction. This algorithm works by constructing a proof graph, which is a data structure that represents a credential graph and maintains certain information on the nodes.
Algorithm 1 (Backward Search: backward(e 0 )) The backward search algorithm constructs a proof graph, maintaining a queue of nodes to be processed; both initially contain just one node, e 0 . Nodes are processed one by one until the queue is empty.
In the proof graph, there is only one node corresponding to each role expression and each edge is added only once. Each time the algorithm tries to create a node for a role expression e, it first checks whether such a node already exists; if not, it creates a new node, adds it into the queue, and uses it. Otherwise, it uses the existing node.
With each node e, the algorithm stores a set of (backward) solutions, which is the set of entity nodes, D, that can reach e (i.e., e * ← D). Each node e also stores a set of (backward) solution monitors, which is the set of objects that want to be notified when the current node receives a solution. Such objects include nodes that e can reach directly and objects created to handle linked roles and intersections, which will be described below. Solutions are propagated from e to e's solution monitors as follows. When a node is notified to add a solution, it checks whether the solution exists in its solution set; if not, it adds the solution and then notifies all its solution monitors about this new solution. When a node e 2 is first added as a solution monitor of e 1 (e.g., as the result of adding e 2 ← e 1 ), all existing solutions on e 1 are copied to e 2 .
Nodes are processed as follows:
• To process a role node A.r, the algorithm finds all credentials that define A.r. For each credential A.r ←− e, it creates a node for e, and adds the credential edge A.r ← e.
• To process an entity node B, the algorithm notifies the node to add B as a solution to itself.
• To process a linked role node A.r 1 .r 2 , the algorithm creates a node for A.r 1 and creates a (backward) linking monitor and adds it to A.r 1 's solution monitors. The monitor, on observing that A.r 1 has received a new solution B, creates a node for B.r 2 and adds the derived link edge A.r 1 .r 2 ← B.r 2 .
• To process an intersection node e = f 1 ∩ · · · ∩ f k , the algorithm creates one intersection monitor, for e, and k nodes, one for each f j . It then adds the monitor to the solution monitors of each node f j . This monitor counts how many times it observes that an entity D is added. If the count reaches k, then the monitor adds the derived intersection edge e ← D.
To summarize, in addition to the nodes and edges in the credential graph, the algorithm constructs monitors that implement closure properties 2 and 3. See Section 4 for more details.
The backward search algorithm uses credentials in a demand driven way. It uses credentials only when processing role nodes; each such processing step finds credentials defining a specific role A.r and creates credential edges for them. Figure 2 shows an example of using the backward search algorithm; the goal there is to find all members of the role A.r 0 .
We next consider the worst-case complexity of backward search. Recall that given a set C of credentials, size(C) = A.r←−e ∈ C |e|, where |A| = |A.r| = |A.r 1 .r 2 | = 1 and
Theorem 3 Given a set C of credentials, let N be the number of credentials in C, and M = size(C). Assuming that finding all credentials that define a role takes time linear in the number of such credentials (e.g., by using hashing), the worst-case time complexity of the backward search algorithm is O(N 3 + N M ) (which is O(N 3 ) when the size of each intersection in C is bounded by O(N )), and the worst-case space complexity is O(N M ).
The proof analyzes the structure of the proof graph constructed by the algorithm. See Appendix A.2. To see that O(N 3 ) is a tight bound for the algorithm, consider the following example:
There are N = 4n credentials. Doing backward search from A 0 .r constructs n 2 edges of the form A 0 .r i .r 0 ← A j .r 0 , where 0 ≤ i, j < n. Each A j .r 0 gets n solutions, so the time complexity is n 3 .
We can see that intersections are not required to achieve the worst-case time complexity of this algorithm. O(N M ) is a tight space bound. The following is an example that reaches the bound:
Note that the worst-case complexity is not the whole picture here, for the following reasons. First, only the parts of credential graphs that are relevant for answering the query are constructed. Example 4 We extend the scenario in Example 3. In addition to the credentials there, we also have thousands of universities that are certified by ABU and millions of students certified by universities. In addition we have all ACM membership credentials and all IEEE membership credentials.
In Example 4, a backward search from EPub.spdiscount takes time linear in the total number of student credentials and ACM membership credentials. So the complexity is O(N ) rather than O(N 3 ). However, even linear complexity seems quite unacceptable if we just want to know whether Alice is entitled to the discount. The forward search algorithm in the next section addresses this issue.
The Forward Search Algorithm
The forward search algorithm answers queries of the third form listed at the top of this section, i.e., it finds all roles that contain a given entity as a member. The direction of the search moves from the subject of a credential towards its issuer.
Algorithm 2 (Forward Search: forward(D 0 )) The forward algorithm has the same overall structure as the backward algorithm. It constructs a proof graph, maintaining a queue of nodes to be processed; both initially contain just one node, D 0 . Nodes are processed one by one until the queue is empty.
On each node e, the algorithm stores a set of (forward) solutions. There are two kinds of solutions: full solutions and partial solutions. Each full solution on e is a role node that is reachable from e. Each partial solution has the form (f 1 ∩ · · · ∩ f k , j), where 1 ≤ j ≤ k. The node e gets the solution (f 1 ∩ · · · ∩ f k , j) when f j is reachable from e. Such a partial solution is just one piece of a proof that e can reach f 1 ∩ · · · ∩ f k . It is passed through edges in the same way as is a full solution. When an entity node D gets the partial solution, it checks whether it has all k pieces; if it does, it adds the edge
Each node e also stores a set of (forward) solution monitors, which includes the nodes that can reach e directly, as well as objects created to handle linked roles. The addition of an edge e 2 ← e 1 results in e 1 being added as a solution monitor on e 2 .
Forward processing a node corresponding to a role expression e has the following three steps.
1. If e is a role B.r 2 , add the role as a solution to the node itself, then create a (forward) linking monitor and add it as a solution monitor on B. This monitor, on observing that B gets a full solution A.r 1 , creates the node A.r 1 .r 2 and adds the edge A.r 1 .r 2 ← B.r 2 .
2. Find all credentials of the form A.r ←− e; for each such credential, create a node for A.r, if none exists, and add the edge A.r ← e.
If e is not an intersection, find all credentials of the form
The forward search algorithm uses credentials in a demand driven way. Each node-processing step finds every credential that has a specific role expression e as its body and also every credential that uses e as part of its body (when the body is an intersection). Figure 3 shows the result of doing forward search using a subset of the credentials in Examples 2 and 3. The goal there is to find all the roles that Alice is a member of.
Theorem 4
Assuming that finding all credentials that use a specific role expression e in their bodies takes time linear in the number of such credentials, the worst-case time complexity for the forward search algorithm is O(N 2 M ), and the worst-case space complexity is O(N M ).
See Appendix A.3 for the proof and an example that reaches the worst-case complexity bound. As in the case of the backward search algorithm, the worst-case complexity is only part of the picture here. If we do a forward search from Alice with the credentials in Example 4, the millions of credentials about other students will not be touched. This illustrates the power of goal-directed algorithms and the importance of searching in the right direction.
The Bidirectional Search Algorithm
To answer queries of the first form listed at the top of this section (i.e., whether a given entity, D, is a member of a given role expression, e) we can use a backward search from e; and when e is a role, we can use a forward search from D as well. We also have the alternative of searching from both D and e at once. We now present such a bidirectional search algorithm.
Algorithm 3 (Bidirectional Search: bidirectional(e, D)) This algorithm combines the forward algorithm and the backward algorithm in a straightforward way. It maintains two queues, one forward processing queue and one backward processing queue, and iteratively removes a node form the queue and process it until both queues are empty. Each node e stores backward solutions EOrg.preferred ←− EOrg.university.student, EOrg.university ←− ABU.accredited ABU.accredited ←− StateU, StateU.student ←− RegistrarB.student, RegistrarB.student ←− Alice The first line of each node gives the node number in order of creation and the role expression represented by the node. The second part of a node lists each solution eventually associated with this node. Each of those solutions and each graph edge is labelled by the number of the node that was being processed when the solution or edge was added. There are five edges that do not have arrows; they represent linking monitors.
(entities that are members of e), full forward solutions (roles that e is a member of), and partial (forward) solutions resulting from intersections, as well as backward and forward solution monitors. The algorithm carries out a backward search from e and a forward search from D at the same time. Whenever an edge is added, both forward and backward solutions propagate. One knows that there is a chain e D when e receives D as a backward solution. When e is a role A.r, one can also check whether D receives A.r as a forward solution. One knows that such a chain does not exist if one cannot find these solutions when the search completes.
The above bidirectional search algorithm may construct a larger graph than does either forward or backward search. However, when credential storage is distributed, bidirectional search can succeed even when both backward and forward search fail. The above algorithm is the foundation of Algorithm 4, the distributed search algorithm to be presented in Section 4.
The bidirectional search algorithm can be improved to avoid full backward search or full forward search when they are unnecessary. To answer a query whether D ∈ expr[S C ](A.r), a type-1 credential A.r ←− B does not need to be used immediately, as it does not contribute to solving the query. One way to improve the algorithm is to pass queries as well as solutions between nodes and to mark nodes to indicate whether backward and/or forward solutions are wanted at them. To determine whether D ∈ expr[S C ](A.r), the improved algorithm adds the query to nodes D and A.r. Then, while backward processing a role node A.r, unless A.r is marked as wanting all backward solutions, the improved algorithm only looks for credentials of the form A.r ←− D or of the form A.r ←− e in which e is not an entity. When a node receives the same query from both directions, we know that the query is true. While backward processing a linked role A.r 1 .r 2 , A.r 1 is marked as wanting all backward solutions, which requires normal (unimproved) backward processing on A.r 1 .
In this paper, we choose not to present the improved algorithm, for the following reasons. First, that algorithm is much more complicated and its correctness proof would be much longer than the one in Section 4. Second, although we expect this improved algorithm to work much better in practice, it does not improve the worst-case complexity. Our purpose in this paper is not to refine a search algorithm. Third, the storage type system to be presented in Section 5 can help improve search efficiency by stopping search in one direction to avoid large fan-out; that makes the improvement here not so crucial.
Enhancements to Search Algorithms
The three algorithms in this section can be enhanced so that when they answer affirmatively one of the queries listed at the top of this section, they construct and return a chain proving the queried relationship, and/or the credentials from which that chain is derived. For this, each solution stored at a node is associated with the adjacent node from which it was propagated. Using this information, it is straightforward to extract a chain from the proof graph, and to compute the set of credentials being used in the chain. For example, to discover a chain proving that S C (A.r) D, one can run a backward search to construct a proof graph. Then, if the node A.r receives D as a backward solution, one knows that D ∈ S C (A.r). One can extract a chain A.r D by tracing backward the path that the solution D traversed from D to A.r, collecting all credentials corresponding to edges in that path. When encountering derived edges, one must also traverse the supporting paths they are derived from. One can enhance the forward and bidirectional searches similarly.
The three algorithms in this section use queues to organize node processing, resulting in breadthfirst search. A variety of search strategies bear consideration, and different algorithms can be developed based on them. If they used stacks, they would perform depth-first search. In general, when there are several nodes that can be explored (from either direction), they can be placed in a priority queue according to some heuristic criteria, e.g., fan-out.
Application to SDSI 2.0
Our algorithms can be used to do chain discovery in SDSI 2.0. A SDSI credential is a type-1 RT 0 credential, a type-2 RT 0 credential, or a credential of the form A.r ←− B.r 1 .r 2 . · · · .r k . Given a set C of SDSI credentials, we define RTrans(C) to be the set of RT 0 credentials that are equivalent to C. See Appendix A.4 for the proof. This O(N 3 L) worst-case complexity is the same as that of the algorithm in Clarke et al. [6] . However, note that the algorithms in [6] is bottom-up, while the algorithms presented here are goal-directed.
The Distributed Credential Chain Discovery Algorithm
In this section, we study chain discovery when credential storage is distributed. In Section 4.1, we extend the algorithms described in Section 3 and present one unified, distributed search algorithm.
Then, we prove in two steps that the distributed search algorithm is correct in a precise sense. In Section 4.2, we prove the first step: the algorithm is sound and complete with respect to the credential graphs of the set of credentials that the algorithm retrieves. In Section 4.3, we introduce notions of traversability to analyze which chains can be discovered when credential storage is distributed, and prove the second step of the correctness argument: when a chain is traversable, the distributed algorithm can retrieve credentials in the chains. (Sections 4.1 and 4.2 give pseudocode and detailed proofs, which some readers may wish to skip when reading for the first time.)
The Distributed Chain Discovery Algorithm
The three algorithms given in the previous section can be used when credential storage is not centralized, but distributed among credentials' subjects and issuers; this is because these algorithms use credentials in a demand driven way. The backward search algorithm asks for credentials that define a specific role. The forward search algorithm asks for credentials that have a specific role expression in their bodies. The bidirectional algorithm does both.
When credential storage is distributed, we assume that there is some mechanism to link an entity A to a server that hosts credentials involving A on A's behalf. A credential involves A if it is issued by A or uses the entity A, a role A.r, or a linked role A.r 1 .r 2 in its body. In the following, when we say "go to A", we mean to contact the server acting on behalf of A for the purpose of obtaining credentials involving A.
When credential storage is distributed, bidirectional search can find some chains that cannot be found by either forward or backward search alone. Each credential defining A.r has A as its issuer, but in the absence of the credential, one does not know its subject or subjects. Consequently, one has no information about where to find such credentials other than to go to A. If such credentials are not stored with A, backward search cannot make progress at the node A.r. Similarly, to find credentials using a role expression e, one can go only to entities 6 in base(e). When credentials using e in their bodies are not stored with subjects, forward search cannot make progress at the node e. The bidirectional algorithm works to find a chain e 0 D 0 by doing forward search from D 0 and backward search from e 0 . It may succeed in finding a chain when using only backward or only forward search fails, e.g., the chain involving two credentials A.r ←− B.r 1 and B.r 1 ←− D 0 , with the first one stored with its issuer A and the second one with its subject D 0 .
We now present a distributed search algorithm that can collect distributed credentials to construct some chains not found by the bidirectional search algorithm in Section 3.6. It unifies backward, forward, and bidirectional search. In the distributed context, we need a unified algorithm because a backward search may benefit from using forward search as well. For example, backward processing a node f 1 ∩ · · · ∩ f k creates f 1 , . . . , f k and results in each of them being backward processed. When one of f 1 , . . . , f k receives an entity D, one should start forward searching from D as well, because it may be that some path f j * ← D can be found only by a bidirectional search. For similar reasons, a distributed forward search may invoke backward search on intersection nodes.
Algorithm 4 (Distributed Chain Discovery) We describe the algorithm in an object-oriented style. We describe two main classes: ProofGraph and ProofNode, and three helper classes: BLinkingMonitor, BIntersectionMonitor, and FLinkingMonitor. We use pseudo-code in Java-style syntax.
Credentials and their components are shown in the same font as elsewhere in the paper, while other program variables are in typewriter font.
Instance variables of ProofGraph
nodes: maintains all nodes in the graph. Can be implemented by using a HashMap that maps role expressions to nodes. edges: maintains all edges in the graph. Should support constant-time existence checking and addition of a new edge. Should also be able to retrieve all edges leaving or entering a node in time linear in the number of such edges. b-proc-queue: backward processing queue. Nodes waiting to be backward processed. f-proc-queue: forward processing queue. Nodes waiting to be forward processed.
Instance Variables of ProofNode:
b-proc-state: backward processing state. Takes one of the following three values: unprocessed, to-be-processed, processed. When a node is created, its b-proc-state should be unprocessed.
When it needs to be b-processed, it is entered into b-proc-queue and its b-proc-state is set to to-be-processed. When the node is taken out and processed, its b-proc-state is set to processed. f-proc-state: forward processing state. Similar to b-proc-state. Takes one of the following three values: unprocessed, to-be-processed, processed. b-solutions: the set of backward solutions (entities). f-solutions: the set of forward solutions (full solutions, which are roles, and partial solutions). b-sol-monitors: the set of objects that want to know when the current node gets a new backward solution. These objects include backward linking monitors, backward intersection monitors, and all the nodes that the current node can reach directly through an edge. f-sol-monitors: the set of objects that want to know when the current node gets a new forward solution. These include forward linking monitors, and all the nodes that can reach the current node directly through an edge. if (e is an intersection) { return; } 36 creds = find all credentials like A.r ←− f 1 ∩ · · · ∩ f k in which f j = e for some j; To answer the three kinds of queries listed at the beginning of Section 3, we can use the following three procedures. The three procedures all use Algorithm 4 and differ only in their initial configurations. More generally, one can create a new proof graph, add some nodes, activate them, run the search algorithm, and return the proof graph as result. We call such a process one run of the distributed search algorithm. Each run R returns a proof graph as the result, which we denote PG R . Each run asks for credentials while executing lines 14, 33, 36. We say that a run discovers a credential if it gets the credential by (executing) line 14 or line 33, and use C(R) to denote the set of credentials discovered by a run R. For the following reason, we do not consider credentials found by line 36 (L36 for short) to be discovered: Every credential found by L36 is a type-4 credential; L38 only retrieves the intersection in its body, and does not construct the credential edge corresponding to it. If such a credential actually contributes to solving the goal, it will be discovered on L33 and used on L34.
Methods of ProofGraph
37 foreach (credential A.r ←− f 1 ∩ · · · ∩ f k in creds) 38 { add-f-solution( f 1 ∩ · · · ∩ f k , j ); n = addNode(f 1 ∩ · · · ∩ f k );
Correctness of the Distributed Chain Discovery Algorithm
We now prove that the distributed algorithm is correct in the following sense: the proof graph PG R , generated by any run R of the algorithm, is sound and complete with respect to the credential graphs of C(R), that is, of the set of credentials the run R discovers.
Theorem 6 (Soundness of Distributed Search) For any run R of the distributed search algorithm, the following two propositions hold. Proof. Observation 1: If a node e 0 in PG R has an entity D 0 as a b-solution, then there is a path e 0 * ← D 0 in PG R . In PG R , a node e can get a backward solution in two ways. One, when e is an entity B, the node gets B as a backward solution when being processed (L22). This is the only case when a new backward solution is introduced to PG R . Two, the node e gets b-solutions when it is a b-sol-monitor on another node e and solutions are propagated from e to e (L51 and L58). The node e is added as a b-sol-monitor on e (L10) only when an edge e ← e is added to the proof graph. Thus, D 0 can be introduced as a solution for the first time only at the node D 0 , and it can be propagated to e 0 only by traversing a path e 0 * ← D 0 in PG R . Observation 2: If e 0 has A 0 .r 0 as a f-solution, then there is a path A 0 .r 0 * ← e 0 in PG R ; in addition, if e 0 has a partial f-solution f 1 ∩ · · · ∩ f k , j , then there is a path f j * ← e 0 in PG R . This follows from arguments similar to those in observation 1.
Observation 3: Let Q be the set of role expressions in PG R but not in G C(R) . If e 2 * ← e 1 exists in PG R , then it exists in G C(R):Q . We use induction on the order of edges being added to PG R to show that every edge in PG R also exists in G C(R):Q . An edge may be added to PG R by (executing) line 15, 20, 28, 34, 40, or 56. case 1: If an edge is added by L15 or L34, it has the form A.r ← e, and A.r ←− e ∈ C(R), so the edge is added to G C(R):Q by closure property 1. The theorem now follows from the three observations.
To assist us in defining and proving a notion of completeness, we introduce some terminology. We say that a node is b-activated (respectively, f-activated ) by a run R, if the method b-activate() (f-activate()) was called on the node during the run. It is not difficult to see that a node is bactivated (respectively, f-activated) by a run R if and only if the node's b-proc-state (f-proc-state) value is "processed" in PG R . So we also say that a node is b-activated (respectively, f-activated) in the proof graph PG R .
The following completeness theorem roughly says that, any path in G C(R):Q also exists in PG R if the run R is set up to look for the path. In addition, if we have a path in PG R , then the solutions propagate correctly, so that one can answer queries by looking up solutions. This theorem guarantees that if a run can discover all credentials in a chain, it can discover the chain.
Theorem 7 (Local Completeness of Distributed Search)
If there exists a path e 2 * ← e 1 in G C(R):Q , then for any run R, the following two propositions hold:
1. If e 2 is b-activated in PG R , then e 2 * ← e 1 exists in PG R , e 1 is b-activated, and all b-solutions on e 1 are also b-solutions on e 2 .
2. If e 1 is f-activated in PG R , then e 2 * ← e 1 exists in PG R , e 2 is f-activated, and all f-solutions on e 2 are also f-solutions on e 1 .
Proof. Observation 1: If a path e 2 * ← e 1 exists in PG R , and e 2 is b-activated, then e 1 is also b-activated. We show that given an edge e ← e in PG R , if e is b-activated, then so is e . The observation will then follow by induction on the length of the path. If e .b-activate() is called before the addition of the edge e ← e , then e .b-activate() is called while adding the edge (L10). If e .b-activate() is called after the addition of the edge, then e ← e exists when e .b-activate() is called, and so e .b-activate() is called on L44.
Observation 2: If a path e 2 * ← e 1 exists in PG R , and e 1 is f-activated, then e 2 is also f-activated. The arguments are similar to those in observation 1.
Observation 3: If a path e 2 PG R , and e is b-activated, then all backward solutions on e are also backward solutions of e . The observation will then follow by induction on the length of the path. When e ← e is first added, e is added as a b-sol-monitor on e . If a b-solution of e is added before the addition of this b-sol-monitor, then the b-solution is propagated when the b-sol-monitor is added to e (L58). If a b-solution to e is added after that, then the b-solution is propagated when it is added (L51). Observation 4: If a path e 2 * ← e 1 exists in PG R , and e 1 is f-activated, then all forward solutions of e 2 are also forward solutions of e 1 . The arguments are similar to those in observation 3.
We now prove proposition 1 by showing that when a path e 2 * ← e 1 exists in G C(R):Q , and e 2 is b-activated in PG R , then e 2 * ← e 1 also exists in PG R . This, together with observations 1 and 3, proves proposition 1.
We use induction over the steps of the construction of E i C(R):Q given in Definition 2. In the base case, for each credential edge in G C(R):Q , there exists a credential in C(R). The credential is discovered by L14 or L33, and an edge is added to PG R immediately by L15 or L34.
For the step, e 2 * ← e 1 is in E Similarly, using observations 2 and 4, we can prove proposition 2.
As a corollary of this theorem, if there is a path e * ← D in G C(R):Q , and e is b-activated in PG R , then e has D as a backward solution. Similarly, if there is a path A.r * ← D in G C(R) , and D is f-activated, then D has A.r as a forward solution.
Traversability of Distributed Chains and Their Discovery
When credential storage is distributed, the distributed search algorithm may not be able to find a credential chain because of credential storage. We introduce notions of traversability to formalize the three different ways in which distributed chains can be located and assembled, depending on the storage characteristics of their constituent credentials. We call the three notions, forward traversability, backward traversability, and confluence, respectively.
Let us first illustrate these three notions through a chain A.r D that consists only of credential edges. In this case, A.r D = A.r * ← D. Suppose that all credentials in A.r * ← D are stored with their subjects. We call A.r * ← D forward traversable because DForward(D) can discover the path, as follows. Obtain from D the first credential of the path and, with it, the identity (and hence the location) of the issuer of that credential. That issuer is the subject of the next credential. By visiting each successive entity in the path and requesting credentials from them, each credential in the path can be obtained. Similarly, if all credentials in A.r * ← D are stored with their issuers, the path is backward traversable, and can be discovered by DBackward(A.r). Credentials in the path can be collected from entities starting with A and working from issuers to subjects. When some credentials are stored with issuers and others with subjects, one can do a bidirectional search, working from both ends towards the middle. To be able to assemble the path A.r * ← D using DBidirectional(A.r, D), it suffices that A.r * ← D can be decomposed into two subpaths, the one starting from D forward traversable and the one ending at A.r backward traversable; in this case, we say that the path A.r * ← D is confluent. The following definition extends these intuitions to chains that contain derived edges as well as credential edges.
Definition 4 (Traversability and Confluence)
Let C be a set of credentials, and e 2 e 1 a chain such that C e 2 e 1 ⊆ C.
The chain e 2 e 1 has the same traversability as the path e 2 * ← e 1 . A path e 2 * ← e 1 is:
Forward traversable if it is empty (e 1 = e 2 ), or it consists entirely of forward traversable edges; Backward traversable if it is empty, or it consists entirely of backward traversable edges; Confluent if it is empty, or it can be decomposed into e 2 * ← e ← e * ← e 1 where e * ← e 1 is forward traversable, e 2 * ← e is backward traversable, and e ← e is confluent. Note that if an edge or a chain is forward or backward traversable, it is also confluent. We are now ready to state and prove the second part of the correctness argument of the distributed search algorithm.
Theorem 8 (Completeness of Distributed Search)
Given a set C of credentials that are stored in a distributed manner, and a chain e 2 e 1 in a credential graph of C, the following three propositions hold.
If e 2
e 1 is backward traversable, then for any run R of the distributed search algorithm: if e 2 is b-activated in PG R , then C(R) ⊇ C e 2 e 1 . In particular, since e 2 is b-activated by the run DBackward(e 2 ), C(DBackward(e 2 )) ⊇ C e 2 e 1 .
2. If e 2 e 1 is forward traversable, then for any run R: if e 1 is f-activated in PG R , then C(R) ⊇ C e 2 e 1 . In particular, C(DForward(e 1 )) ⊇ C e 2 e 1 .
3. If e 2 e 1 is confluent, then for any two runs R 1 and R 2 : if e 1 is f-activated in R 1 and e 2 is b-activated in R 2 , then C(R 2 ) ∪ C(R 1 ) ⊇ C e 2 e 1 . In particular, C(DBackward(e 2 )) ∪ C(DForward(e 1 )) ⊇ C e 2 e 1 . 7
See Appendix A.5 for the proof. Theorems 8 and 7 together ensure that any traversable chain will be found by the distributed search algorithm.
A Type System for Distributed Credential Storage
If we assume that all credentials are stored with their issuers, then all chains are backward traversable. Similarly, if we assume that all credentials are stored with their subjects, all chains are forward traversable. As we argued in Section 1.1, neither assumption is realistic in practice. Yet some constraints must be imposed on credential storage, or else some chains cannot be discovered without trying to contact every entity in the system. For example, consider a chain A 1 .r ← A 2 .r ← A 3 .r. If both credentials are stored only with A 2 , then knowing only A 1 .r and A 3 .r, one cannot discover the chain. One observation from this simple example is that if we require that all credentials defining roles using the role name r have the same storage characteristics, the chain is either backward or forward traversable. Capitalizing on this observation, we introduce in this section a type system for distributed credential storage, the important feature of which is that, given a set of well typed credentials, every chain e e 1 is confluent if e is well typed. The type system provides this global guarantee by imposing local constraints on each credential. We then go on to explore various ways these constraints might be relaxed, and analyze their advantages and disadvantages. We also present a practical mechanism for achieving agreement about type assignments.
A Type System for Credential Storage
In our storage type system, each role name r has two types: an issuer-side type and a subject-side type. On the issuer side, each role name has one of three type values: issuer-traces-none, issuertraces-def, and issuer-traces-all. If a role name r is issuer-traces-def, then from any entity A one can find all credentials defining A.r. In other words, A must store all credentials defining A.r. However, this does not guarantee that one can find all members of A.r. For instance, we might have A.r ←− B.r 1 , with r 1 issuer-traces-none. This motivates the stronger type: issuer-traces-all. A role name r being issuer-traces-all implies not only that A stores all credentials defining A.r, but also that any credential A.r ←− B.r 1 has B.r 1 issuer-traces-all, as well. By generalizing this basic idea, we obtain the result that, for any entity A, using (distributed) backward search, one can determine all the members of A.r. (In this section, all searches are distributed, and so we omit the word distributed from now on.)
On the subject side, each role has one of two type values: subject-traces-none and subjecttraces-all. If a role name r is subject-traces-all, the intention is that from any entity D, forward search can find all roles of the form A.r such that D is a member of A.r. For instance, if there is a credential A.r ←− B.r 1 , then B has to store this credential. Moreover, the type rules for credentials will require that r 1 is also subject-traces-all, if this credential is to be well typed. These intuitions are captured by the definition of well typed credentials in Definition 7 below.
There are three values for the issuer-side type and two values for the subject-side type, yielding six combinations. Among them, one combination is illegal; if a role name r is both issuer-tracesnone and subject-traces-none, no one is required to store credentials defining A.r, and so such credentials cannot be discovered. This leads to the notion of well typed role names.
Definition 5 (Well-typedness of Role Names)
• A role name is strongly well typed if it is issuer-traces-all or subject-traces-all.
• A role name is weakly well typed if it is both issuer-traces-def and subject-traces-none.
• A role name is well typed if it is strongly well typed or weakly well typed.
• A role name is ill-typed if it is not well typed. In other words, a role name is ill-typed if it is both issuer-traces-none and subject-traces-none.
We now extend this notion of well-typedness to role expressions and then define the notion of well typed credentials. As we show below in Section 5.3, Definitions 5, 6, and 7 together guarantee that when credentials are well typed, the following three propositions hold:
1. If a role expression e is well typed, then any chain e e 1 is confluent, and so from any member D of e, one can discover e D by doing bidirectional search.
2. If e is issuer-traces-all, then every chain e e 1 is backward traversable, and so one can find all members of e by doing backward search from e.
3. If e is subject-traces-all, then every chain e e 1 is forward traversable, and so from any member D of e, one can discover e D by doing forward search from D.
Definition 6 (Well-typedness of role expressions)
• An entity A is both issuer-traces-all and subject-traces-all.
• A role A.r has the same type as r.
• A linked role A.r 1 .r 2 is
issuer-traces-all if both r 1 and r 2 are issuer-traces-all subject-traces-all if both r 1 and r 2 are subject-traces-all weakly well typed otherwise, if either r 1 is issuer-traces-all and r 2 is well typed, or r 1 is well typed and r 2 is subject-traces-all ill-typed otherwise
issuer-traces-all if there exists an f that is issuer-traces-all, and all f j 's are well typed subject-traces-all if there exists an f that is subject-traces-all, and all f j 's are well typed weakly well typed if all f j 's are weakly well typed ill-typed otherwise
The intuition behind the rule for a well-typed linked role A.r 1 .r 2 is as follows. To discover a chain A.r 1 .r 2 D , one needs to discover two subchains, A.r 1 B and B.r 2 D , for some entity B. If both r 1 and r 2 are issuer-traces-all, then both subchains will be shown to be backward traversable, so one can discover A.r 1 B by starting from A.r 1 , searching to B, then continuing from B.r 2 to D. If both r 1 and r 2 are subject-traces-all, both subchains are forward traversable, starting from D, and proceeding through B.r 2 and B to A.r 1 . Now, if A.r 1 B is backward traversable, B.r 2 D can be discovered by bidirectional search from both B.r 2 and D, and so only needs to be confluent. Similarly, if B.r 2 D is forward traversable, A.r 1 B only needs to be confluent.
Definition 7 (Well Typed Credentials)
A credential A.r ←− e is structurally well typed if the following three conditions are satisfied:
1. Both A.r and e are well typed.
2. If A.r is issuer-traces-all, e must also be issuer-traces-all.
3. If A.r is subject-traces-all, e must also be subject-traces-all.
A credential A.r ←− e is well typed if it is structurally well typed and satisfies the following two storage requirements:
• If A.r is issuer-traces-def or issuer-traces-all, A stores this credential.
• If A.r is subject-traces-all, every subject of this credential stores this credential.
Examples of Storage Types
We now discuss some examples of storage types.
Example 5 Let us consider a type assignment for credentials in Example 3. The corresponding credential chain EPub.spdiscount Alice is shown in Figure 4 . One appropriate type assignment is as follows: spdiscount, preferred, university are issuer-traces-def and subject-traces-none accredited, student, member are issuer-traces-none and subject-traces-all
Under this type assignment, all the credentials are structurally well typed. To satisfy the storage requirements for well typed credentials, credential (1) is stored with EPub, (2) and (3) are stored with EOrg, (4) is stored with StateU, (5) is stored with RegistrarB, and both (6) and (7) are stored with Alice. One can verify that the chain EPub.discount Alice in Figure 4 can be discovered by doing bidirectional search. (2) ⇒ EOrg.university.student StateU.student (5) ⇐ RegistrarB.student Figure 4 : The chain EOrg.discount Alice discovered by DBidirectional(EOrg.discount, Alice), with the set of credentials in Example 3, typed as in Example 5. Edges with numbers are credential edges; the numbers above (or to the right of) edges correspond to the credential numbers in Example 3. Double arrows originate at a role expression whose base stores the corresponding credential. Thus, if the double arrow has the same direction as the edge, the credential can be discovered by forward search. Otherwise, the credential can be discovered by backward search.
Now consider Example 4, in which we also have millions of credentials about other universities and students. Under this type assignment, DBidirectional(EOrg.discount, Alice) does not touch those credentials. This is because backward search stops at ACM.member, EOrg.university.student, and ABU.accredited, since credentials defining ABU.accredited and ACM.member are not stored with issuers. This shows that distributed chain discovery is practical with appropriate storage type assignment.
Continuing the discussions in Example 5, we now show some type assignments that make the chain EPub.spdiscount Alice unable to be discovered. We also show that these assignments make one or more credentials not structurally well typed, and so are "prevented" by the type system.
One assignment is obtained from that in Example 5 by making university issuer-traces-none and subject-traces-all, and making accredited issuer-traces-def and subject-traces-none. This assignment causes credentials (3) and (4) to be stored only with ABU, making it impossible to discover the subchain EOrg.university StateU . However, it would also make credential (3) not structurally well typed, since EOrg.university is subject-traces-all, but the body of the credential, ABU.accredited, is not.
Another assignment is obtained from Example 5 by making student issuer-traces-all (or issuertraces-def) and subject-traces-none. This results in both (4) and (5) being stored with StateU, making it impossible to discover the subchain EOrg.university.student RegistrarB.student . However, according to Definition 6, EOrg.university.student is ill-typed, since university is weakly well typed and student is not subject-traces-all; as a result, credential (2) is not structurally well typed.
Now we consider two assignments that are correct, but less practical. The first is again a variant on Example 5. It changes the type of university and of accredited to be issuer-traces-all, and it makes student issuer-traces-def. This results in credentials (3), (4), and (5) being stored with their issuers. Although correct, this assignment is not as practical as the one in Example 5, because it requires backward processing of ABU.accredited and EOrg.university.student. In the scenario in Example 4, credentials about other universities and students are also discovered, resulting in a very large proof graph.
Another impractical assignment makes all role names in Example 5 subject-traces-all. In this case, all credentials must be stored with their subjects. For instance, credential (3) would be stored by ABU. In the example, credential (3) is in effect a local policy of EOrg, and of no concern to ABU. Neither party may consider such an arrangement reasonable.
This discussion illustrates that the design of type assignments is subject to pitfalls of at least three kinds. First, assignments inherently preclude certain credentials being well-typed. (This is the fundamental mechanism through which the type system guarantees traversability.) Thus type assignments must be designed to avoid precluding credentials that are needed. Second, well designed type assignments can significantly improve search performance. Third, the storage requirements must be agreeable to the parties that must implement them. Our conclusion is that type-assignment design should be left to experts. We return to this issue in Sections 5.5 and 5.6 below.
Traversability of Well Typed Chains
In this section we show that, given a set of well typed credentials whose storage is distributed, one can answer the three forms of queries enumerated at the beginning of Section 3 by using the distributed search algorithm in Section 4.
Theorem 9 (Traversability of Well Typed Chains) Given a set C of well typed credentials, and any chain e e 1 in a credential graph G C:Q of C, the following propositions hold:
1. If e is well typed, e e 1 is confluent.
2. If e is issuer-traces-all, e e 1 is backward traversable.
3. If e is subject-traces-all, e e 1 is forward traversable.
See Appendix A.6 for the proof. From Theorems 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, and 9, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 10 Given a set C of well typed credentials, the following three propositions hold:
1. Given an entity D and a role expression e that is well typed, one can use DBidirectional(D, e) to determine whether D ∈ expr[S C ](e).
2. Given a role expression e that is issuer-traces-all, one can use DBackward(e) to determine expr[S C ](e).
3. Given an entity D, one can use DForward(D) to determine all the roles A.r such that A.r is subject-traces-all and D ∈ S C (A.r).
Proof. We prove only proposition 1. The proof of propositions 2 and 3 are similar. Proposition 1 follows from the above three observations.
Discussions and Extensions to the Storage Type System
One obvious thing to note about the storage type system is that there are three issuer-side type values and only two subject-side type values. One may ask why is there not a value subject-tracesdef. We now explain the reason. The goal of the type system is to ensure that one can discover a chain once both ends are known. Consider a path A.r ← B.r 1 ← D; to discover it, starting from A.r and D, a search has to be able to move one step, either backward from A.r or forward from D, to find B.r 1 . To enable a search to move one step backward from A.r, credentials defining A.r need to be stored with A. To enable moving one step forward from D, the credential B.r 1 ←− D needs to be subject-stored. Suppose we did add subject-traces-def, and assigned it as the type of r. Neither of the above one-step moves would then be guaranteed possible. By contrast, the stronger subject-traces-all type imposes structural requirements on well-typed credentials, as well as storage requirements. Specifically, if r is subject-traces-all, r 1 must be too, by well-typedness of A.r ←− B.r 1 , thus ensuring that B.
One also may ask, if two subject-side type values suffice, why have three issuer-side values? We need the stronger issuer-traces-all value in addition to issuer-traces-def because of linked roles. For A.r 1 .r 2 to be well typed, it is insufficient to have both r 1 and r 2 issuer-traces-def; however r 2 can be issuer-traces-def when r 1 is issuer-traces-all.
In the rest of this section, we discuss two extensions to the storage type system.
Adding preference in tracing direction
As we have seen in Section 5.2, storage types can be used to limit search space as well as to guarantee discovering credentials. For example, if the role names, accredited and student, are subject-traceable (i.e., subject-traces-all), rather than issuer-traceable (issuer-traces-all or issuertraces-def), then searching is more efficient. In practice, a role name may be both issuer-traceable and subject-traceable; however, searching from one direction is often preferred. This observation motivates us to enhance the type system to encode this preference. When a role name is both issuer-traceable and subject-traceable, one can specify which direction is preferred for traversing credentials that define the role name. For example, ACM may maintain all membership credentials (e.g., to enable finding all members when needed) and, at the same time, expect its members to store and to provide those credentials themselves when needed. In this case, we can specify the role name, member, to be both subject-traces-all and issuer-traces-all, with subject-tracing preferred. This way, backward searches that involve individual members can stop when they encounter ACM.member, thereby avoiding large fan-out.
Storing type-1 and other types of credentials differently
In Section 1.1, we briefly discussed an approach requiring that all type-1 credentials be stored with subjects and all other types of credentials be stored with issuers. We showed that this approach is not by itself sufficient to guarantee that credential chains can be discovered, due to the presence of linked roles. Nevertheless, this idea has some appeal. When a role can be defined by type-1 credentials as well as by other kinds of credentials, it may be desirable to allow all type-1 credentials to be stored with subjects and other credentials with issuers. This additional flexibility may be needed for some applications. We introduce an extended type system to allow this flexibility, while still ensuring that chains can be discovered in the presence of linked roles. In this system, a role name can be issuer-tracesnone, issuer-traces-rule, issuer-traces-def, or issuer-traces-all on the issuer side and subject-tracesnone, subject-traces-fact, or subject-traces-all on the subject side. Both of these lists are in order of increasing strength of the associated storage requirements.
We need to change two things in Definitions 5, 6, and 7. First, a role name is weakly well typed when it is issuer-traces-def and subject-traces-none, or when it is issuer-traces-def and subjecttraces-fact, or when it is issuer-traces-rule and subject-traces-fact. Second, the storage requirements for a credential A.r ←− e to be well typed is changed as follows.
• The issuer A has to store the credential if r is issuer-traces-all or issuer-traces-def, or if r is issuer-traces-rule and e is not an entity.
• The subjects of the credential have to store it if r is subject-traces-all, or if r is subject-tracesfact and e is an entity.
Given this extended type system, Theorem 9 still holds. The proof is almost the same as that of Theorem 9. See Appendix A.7 for details.
Agreeing on Types and Meanings of Role Names
We now discuss some questions related to the practical use of the storage type system. Our type system raises the following question: How can entities agree on the type of a role name? A similar problem exists even without storage types. When an entity A defines A.r to contain B.r 1 , it needs to understand what B means by the role name r 1 . Consider again the credentials in Example 1, whose credential graph we repeat here:
Given the role StateU.student, how does EOrg know what StateU means by student? Is it issued to students registered in any class, or only to students enrolled in a degree program? If EOrg does not know, how can EOrg issue a credential EOrg.preferred ←− StateU.student? This is the problem of establishing a common vocabulary. Different entities need a common vocabulary before they can use each others' roles. This problem arises in all trust-management systems. However, name agreement is particularly critical in systems, like RT 0 , that support attribute-based delegation. For instance, the expression EOrg.university.student only makes sense when universities use student for the same purpose.
We present the following scheme to achieve name agreement. The scheme is inspired by XML namespaces [5] . We introduce application domain specification documents (ADSDs). Each ADSD defines a vocabulary. In the RT framework [17] , ADSDs are used to define data types and parameter types of parameterized roles. Since role names in RT 0 cannot take parameters, an RT 0 vocabulary is just a suite of related role names. We can use ADSDs to also declare storage types of the role names. An ADSD generally should give natural-language explanations of these role names, including the conditions under which credentials defining them should be issued. A logical role name consists of two parts, a vocabulary id that uniquely identifies an ADSD, e.g., a URI to the ADSD, and a role id that is declared in the ADSD.
Example 6 Consider the credentials in Example 3. There we just use role ids for role names and ignore the issues of which ADSDs they belong to. These role names are likely to be declared in different ADSDs. One possible scenario is that there are four ADSDs involved.
1. An ADSD local to EPub, which declares spdiscount.
2. An ADSD about EOrg's policies, created by EOrg; it declares preferred and university.
3. An ADSD about universities and students, which may be created by ABU or others; it declares accredited and student. 4. An ADSD about ACM members, which is created by ACM, it declares member.
Other scenarios are also possible. In the credential ACM.member ←− Alice, the role name, member, may refer to an ADSD created jointly by several professional organizations. In the credential StateU.student ←− RegistrarB.student, the student in the body may refer to an ADSD created locally by StateU, while the one in the head refers to an ADSD created by ABU. In that case, the two occurrences of student refer to two different logical role names, and they may have different storage types.
When there are multiple ADSDs about university students, a university can freely choose which ADSD to use when it issues credentials. A university can issue multiple student credentials using different ADSDs, or, if appropriate, it can issue vocabulary-mapping credentials, each one translating the student role id in one ADSD to the student role id in another ADSD.
Each ADSD defines a vocabulary. The notion of vocabularies is complimentary to the notion of localized name spaces for roles. Each addresses a distinct role name-space issue. A role consists of an issuer, a vocabulary id, and a role id. Each issuer of credentials has its own localized name space within which the issuer has sole authority to define role members. Each vocabulary id specifies a distinct vocabulary of role names, thus enabling different issuers to agree on a common understanding of those role names.
Whether to Allow Localized Storage Types
Our type system requires consistent storage of credentials across roles that use the same role name. In principle, this requirement can be relaxed, which might seem advantageous to support greater decentralization. In this approach, A.r and B.r can have different types. It remains true that when each credential is well typed, credential chains can be discovered. However, in this section we argue that such an approach is inconsistent with the goals of having attribute-based delegation and distributed storage, and that it has other practical difficulties.
First and foremost, if different universities may assign different types to roles using the same role name, student, then the type-3 credential EOrg.preferred ←− EOrg.university.student can be used only when EOrg.university is issuer-traces-all. This follows because now it is safe to assume only that B.student is weakly well typed. In our view, requiring the first part of every linked role (like EOrg.university) to be traversed backward is unacceptably restrictive. Moreover, because the type of the second part (student) is undetermined, the linked role, too, can at best be assumed to be weakly well typed, so EOrg.preferred cannot be issuer-traces-all. Consequently, one cannot use EOrg.preferred to start a linked role. This makes it impossible to implement long linked local names in SDSI.
Second, each entity A that issues credentials of the form A.r ←− B.r 1 has to have a consistent view of the storage type that B assigns to B.r 1 . This requires much more infrastructure support than does supporting consistency at the role-name level. The latter can be supported through ADSDs in some sense for free, since ADSDs are needed by the RT framework for other reasons [17] .
Third, type assignments guarantee traversability by imposing storage requirements and precluding certain credentials being well-typed. Also, some type assignments lead to more efficient searches than do others. For these reasons, we argue that type assignments should be designed by experts who are familiar with the application domain and anticipate certain credential templates. This is at odds with types being assigned at the level of individual roles.
Future and Related Work
In this section, we illustrate briefly the next step in our Role-based Trust-management framework work, and then discuss other future directions and related work.
Ongoing Related Work
As mentioned in Section 1, RT 0 is the first step in a series of Role-based Trust-management languages. In [17] , four more components of RT are defined; they are RT 1 , RT 2 , RT T , and RT D . RT 1 extends RT 0 in allowing role names to take parameters and credentials to use variables. For example, the credential OS.fileop(delete, ?file) ←− OS.owner(?file) can be used to express the policy that the operating system will let a file's owner delete the file. RT 2 adds to RT 1 logical objects, which allows one to group logically related resources together and to assign permissions about them together. RT T provides manifold roles and role-product operators, which can express threshold and separation-of-duty policies. RT D provides delegation of role activations, which can express selective use of capacities (role memberships) and delegation of these capacities. See [17] for more details.
Like most prior trust-management work, we assume in this paper that credentials are freely available to the agent responsible for making access control decisions. In general, credentials may contain sensitive information. To protect sensitive credentials while allowing them to be used in a decentralized environment, trust management-style access control can be applied to credentials, as to any other resource. Trust can be established between two entities in such a context through an iterative process of revealing credentials to one another, called a trust negotiation [21] . Concurrently with the design of RT , we are developing a system for automated trust negotiation that supports RT . A design supporting RT 0 is presented in [20] , where additional references to work in this area can also be found. By taking advantage of the distributed chain discovery algorithm and the storage type system presented here, the trust negotiation system ensures that the two entities participating in the trust negotiation can discover and collect, either before or during the negotiation, all credentials required to construct each chain that is needed during trust negotiation.
Storage Types and Complete Information
Inferencing based on credentials stored in a distributed manner is often limited by not knowing whether all relevant credentials are present. Because trust management aims to deal with authorization in distributed systems, most TM languages are monotonic. In contrast, most work on access control models in centralized environments allow non-monotonicity in the form of negative authorizations or constraints.
Limiting the system to be monotonic ensures that, even without access to all credentials, if the credentials that are present indicate D is a member of A.r, it is certainly true. Missing credentials could make you unable to prove D is a member of A.r, but cannot lead you to conclude D is a member of A.r erroneously. However, some policies are non-monotonic in nature. Examples include constraints in RBAC, such as mutually exclusive roles (i.e., roles that cannot have common members), and cardinality of roles (e.g., a role can have at most a certain number of members).
The storage type approach presented in this paper could be used to help solve this problem. The type system ensures we know who to contact to request the relevant credentials. So assuming they respond and we trust that they give us the credentials we ask for, we can assume that we obtain all the credentials that are relevant. In this context, it may be safe to use non-monotonic inference rules. It will be necessary to manage the trust issue. For instance, we may trust that some issuers will give us all relevant credentials, while not trusting some subjects to do the same. We do not claim that the storage type system solves the problem of having non-monotonic policies; nevertheless, we believe that it could be one useful tool.
Decentralized Construction of Proof Graphs
In Section 4, proof graph construction is centralized in one entity, although credentials can be stored in a distributed manner. An interesting extension to this is to have each entity maintain a part of the whole graph. In fact, such graphs can be used as a storage format for credentials.
In the following, we prove that the discovery problem of RT 0 is log-space P-complete; thus is "inherently sequential" [10] . As usual, P is the class of problems solvable in deterministic polynomial time. It is widely conjectured that problems that are P-complete are not in NC, which is the class of problems that can be solved on a Parallel Random Access Machine using log n O(1) parallel time and n O(1) processors.
One problem that is log-space P-complete is the monotone circuit value problem (MCVP). A monotonic circuit β is a sequence (β 0 , . . . , β n ), where each β i is either an input, an AND gate AN D(j, k), or an OR gate OR(j, k); and the 0,1 values of the inputs are given explicitly. M CV P = {β | β is a monotone circuit with the output value of β n = 0}. From [10] , we have: M CV P is log-space complete for P.
Theorem 11
The discovery problem for RT 0 is log-space P-complete.
Proof. We prove that RT 0 , even without intersections, is log-space P-complete. This means that name reduction in SDSI 2.0 is also log-space P-complete. Given an instance of M CV P , β, construct a set of credentials C as follows. C has one entity: 1. Each β i is mapped to a role 1.β i . If an input β i has value 1, a credential 1.β i ←− 1 is added to C; if the input has value 0, no credential is added. For each AND gate β i = AN D(β j , β k ), a credential 1.β i = 1.β j .β k is added. For each OR gate β i = OR(β j , β k ), two credentials 1.β i ←− 1.β j and 1.β i ←− 1.β k are added. Clearly, β n = 1 if and only if the role 1.β n has 1 as its member. The reduction only takes constant space.
This result suggests that it is unlikely to obtain exponential speedup by applying polynomial processors to chain discovery. It remains worthwhile to investigate how much speedup can be obtained by performing distributed construction of proof graphs. It would be particularly interesting to understand the tradeoff between communication and computation costs. For this purpose, PRAM is not an appropriate computation model, since it does not model communication cost.
Other Related Work
The problem of general distributed credential storage has not been studied extensively in TM literature. QCM [12] and SD3 [13] are previous trust-management systems that consider distributed storage of credentials. The approach in QCM and SD3 assumes that issuers initially store all credentials and every query is answered by doing a form of backward search. This is impractical for many applications, including the examples in this paper.
The language RT 0 is closely related to SDSI 2.0 and Delegation Logic. See Section 2.1 for a comparison of RT 0 credentials with name definition certificates in SDSI 2.0 and Section 3.1 for review of existing work on chain discovery in SDSI. RT 0 can be viewed as a syntactically sugared version of a subset of Delegation Logic (DL). Through a type-1 RT 0 credential, the issuer can express the judgement that a subject has a certain attribute. A basic credential in DL has only an issuer and a statement. Although one can encode the subject and attribute together in a statement, DL lacks the explicit subject abstraction, which we desire for the following reasons. The explicit abstraction allows clear, concise representation of attribute-based delegation, e.g., in the form of linked roles. As we have seen in this paper, the subject abstraction enables distributed storage and discovery of credentials. It also enables us to view attributes similarly to roles in Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) [19] , and to use concepts similar to role activations to enable entities to make selective use of those roles. See [17] for more details.
Conclusions
We have introduced a simple Role-based Trust-management language RT 0 and a set-theoretic semantics for it. We have also introduced credential graphs as a searchable representation of credentials in RT 0 and have proven that reachability in credential graphs is sound and complete with respect to the semantics of RT 0 . Based on credential graphs, we have given goal-directed algorithms to do credential chain discovery in RT 0 both when credential storage is centralized and when credential storage is distributed. Goal-directed algorithms provide better expected-case performance than do bottom-up algorithms, such as those developed by previous work in the context of SDSI. We have also introduced a type system for credential storage that guarantees distributed, well typed credential chains can be discovered by the distributed search algorithm. This type system can also be used to help improve the efficiency of search by guiding search in the right direction, making distributed chain discovery with large numbers of credentials feasible.
A Proofs

A.1 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. The proof is by induction on {rmem i } i∈N , whose limit is S C . We show that for each i ∈ N , for any D and e 0 , if D ∈ expr[rmem i ](e 0 ), then e 0 * ← D exists in G C:{e 0 } . The basis is trivial. For the step, fix any D and e 0 such that D ∈ expr[rmem i+1 ](e 0 ). There are four cases based on the structure of e 0 . For cases 1-3, we show that e 0 * ← D exists in G C , which is a subgraph of G C:{e 0 } . case 1: e 0 is an entity, in which case it has to be D. We have D * ← D as the required path. case 2: e 0 is a role A.r, in which case D ∈ rmem i+1 (A.r). By definition of rmem i+1 there exists A.r ←− e ∈ C such that D ∈ expr[rmem i ](e). G C has A.r ← e by closure property 1. By induction hypothesis, e * ← D exists in G C:{e} , which equals G C , since e appears in a credential. Therefore, we have the required path A.r ← e * ← D in G C . 
A.2 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. We analyze the structure of the proof graph constructed by doing backward search. If we view monitors as special edges, the dominating factor in time complexity is the number of times that a solution passes through an edge. Each solution traverses an edge, e 2 ← e 1 , at most once, since it is added to e 1 at most once. There are five classes of edges: 1 and 3) . Therefore, the space complexity is O(N M ).
A.3 Proof of Theorem 4
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Theorem 3. We analyze the structure of the proof graph constructed by the forward search algorithm.
Observation 1: Each node has O(N ) full solutions and O(M ) partial solutions. For a role to become a full solution to any node other than itself, it has to be defined by some credential; there are thus O(N ) full solutions. For each intersection f 1 ∩· · ·∩f k , O(k) partial solutions are generated; therefore, the total number of partial solutions are O(M ). Observation 3: The total number of solutions on all linked-role nodes are O(N M ). There are O(N ) linked roles that have any full solutions, because such a linked role has to appear by itself as the body of some credential in C. The total number of solutions on these nodes is O(N M ), following observation 1. Each linked role that has no full solution gets one partial solution for each place it occurs in an intersection in C. The total number of such occurrences for all linked-role nodes is O(M ), so the total number of solutions for these nodes is O(M ).
If we view monitors as special edges, the dominating factor in time complexity is the number of times that a solution passes through an edge. There are four kinds of edges: 
A.5 Proof of Theorem 8
Proof. We prove the three propositions simultaneously by considering edges in e 2 e 1 and using induction over the steps of the construction of E i C:Q in Definition 2. Base Case: the chain e 2 e 1 contains only edges in E 0 C:Q , i.e., credential edges; in which case e 2 e 1 = e 2 * ← e 1 . prop 1: e 2 e 1 is backward traversable. We need to prove that if e 2 is b-activated in PG R , then C(R) ⊇ C e 2 e 1 . We use an inner induction on the length of e 2 * ← e 1 . The inner base case, in which e 1 = e 2 , is trivial. For the step, we decompose e 2 * ← e 1 into e 2 ← e * ← e 1 . Then there is a credential e 2 ←− e that is stored with its issuer, and C e 2 e 1 = e 2 ←− e ∪ C e e 1 . The existence of the credential e 2 ←− e implies that e 2 is a role; backward processing of e 2 discovers the credential e 2 ←− e (L14), and adds the edge, which results in e being b-activated (L10 via L15). Inner induction hypothesis says that C(R) ⊇ C e e 1 , and so this proposition follows.
prop 2: e 2 * ← e 1 is forward traversable. We need to prove that if e 1 is f-activated in PG R , then C(R) ⊇ C e 2 e 1 . We use an inner induction on the length of e 2 * ← e 1 , and for the step, decompose e 2 * ← e 1 into e 2 * ← e ← e 1 . Then there is a credential e ←− e 1 that is stored with each entity in base(e 1 ). Forward processing e 1 discovers the credential, and adds the edge, which results in e being f-activated (L34). Inner induction hypothesis says that C(R) ⊇ C e 2 e , and so the proposition follows. prop 3: e 2 * ← e 1 is confluent. We need to prove that if e 1 is f-activated in R 1 and e 2 is bactivated in R 2 , then C(R 2 ) ∪ C(R 1 ) ⊇ C e 2 e 1 . By definition, e 2 * ← e 1 can be decomposed into e 2 * ← e ← e * ← e 1 , with e * ← e 1 forward traversable, e 2 * ← e backward traversable, and e ← e confluent. A confluent edge in E 0 C:Q is either backward or forward traversable. If e ← e is backward traversable, so is e 2 * ← e . The two propositions above say that C(R 2 ) ⊇ C e 2 e and C(R 1 ) ⊇ C e e 1 . And so C(R 2 ) ∪ C(R 1 ) ⊇ C e 2 e 1 . Similar arguments cover the case that e ← e is forward traversable, and so the proposition follows.
Induction
Step: We consider the case when e 2 e 1 ⊆ E i+1 C:Q but e 2 e 1 ⊆ E i C:Q . prop 1: Let e ← e be the (unique) edge in E i+1 C:Q − E i C:Q . Then e ← e is a derived edge, and it is on the path e 2 * ← e 1 ; therefore, e 2 * ← e 1 can be decomposed into e 2 * ← e ← e * ← e 1 , in which chains e 2 e and e e 1 are in E i C:Q , and so C e 2 e 1 = C e 2 e ∪ C e e 1 . Because e 2 e 1 is backward traversable, so are e 2 e , e ← e , and e e 1 . When e 2 is b-activated, by induction hypothesis, C(R) ⊇ C e 2 e ; furthermore, from Theorem 7, e is b-activated. We still need to prove C(R) ⊇ C e e 1 . Based on how e ← e is introduced, there are two cases. One, e ← e is a derived link edge of the form A.r 1 .r 2 ← B.r 2 , and A.r 1 B is in E i C:Q . Then we have C e e 1 = C A.r 1 B ∪ C B.r 2 e 1 . Since A.r 1 .r 2 is b-activated, it is backward processed, and so A.r 1 in b-activated (L18). By induction hypothesis, C(R) ⊇ C A.r 1 B ; from Theorem 7, A.r 1 has B as a backward solution, which results in B.r 2 being created and b-activated (L20). By induction hypothesis, C(R) ⊇ C B.r 2 e 1 . Therefore, the proposition holds. Two, e ← e is a derived intersection edge, in which case it has the form f C:Q and is confluent, by induction hypothesis 3, C(R) ∪ C(R) ⊇ C f j D . Therefore, the proposition follows. prop 2: When e 2 e 1 is forward traversable, the arguments are similar to those for proposition 1.
prop 3: When e 2 e 1 is confluent. By definition, the path e 2 * ← e 1 can be decomposed into e 2 * ← e ← e * ← e 1 , in which e e 1 is forward traversable, e 2 e backward traversable, and e ← e confluent. The two propositions above say that C(R 2 ) ⊇ C e 2 e and C(R 1 ) ⊇ C e e 1 . From Theorem 7, e is b-activated in R 2 , and e is f-activated in R 1 . The edge e ← e has the following three cases.
case a: e ← e is a credential edge, in which case e ← e is either backward or forward traversable, and so the credential e ←− e is in C(R 1 ) or C(R 2 ).
case b: e ← e is a derived link edge A.r 1 .r 2 ← B.r 2 , in which case A.r 1 B is in E i C:Q and is confluent. Since e = A.r 1 .r 2 is b-activated in R 2 , so is A.r 1 (L18). Since e = B.r 2 is f-activated in R 1 , so is B (L32). By induction hypothesis, C(R 2 ) ∪ C(R 1 ) ⊇ C A.r 1 B . Therefore, the proposition follows. 
A.6 Proof of Theorem 9
Proof. By Definition 4, e e 1 has the same traversability as e * ← e 1 , so we prove the three propositions for e * ← e 1 . We do this simultaneously by using an induction over the steps of the construction of E i C:Q given in Definition 2. Base Case: Here, the path e * ← e 1 contains only edges in E 0 C:Q , i.e., credential edges. We use a second, inner induction on the length of e * ← e 1 . The inner base case, in which e = e 1 , is trivial. For the step, we decompose e * ← e 1 into e ← e 2 * ← e 1 . Because e ← e 2 is in E 0 C:Q , there is a well typed credential of the form e ←− e 2 .
hypothesis then tells us that each f j * ← B is confluent. Consequently, f 1 ∩ · · · ∩ f k ← B is also confluent. This means that e * ← e 1 is confluent, as required to complete the proof.
A.7 Proof of Theorem 9 with Extended Type System
Proof. The proof for Theorem 9 in the previous section applies almost without change. The only change is in the step of the inner induction.
When the path e * ← e 1 in E 0 C:Q is decomposed into e ← e 2 * ← e 1 , and e is weakly well typed, there is a case other than e being issuer-traces-def; e may be issuer-traces-rule and subject-traces-fact. We need to prove that e * ← e 1 is confluent. When e 2 is not an entity, the edge e ← e 2 is backward traversable; this follows essentially as it does in the issuer-traces-def case. When e 2 is an entity, e 1 = e 2 is also an entity, since an entity node has no incoming edge. Thus the path e * ← e 1 consists of one credential stored with its subject, which is clearly confluent.
